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Abstract - We proposed a secured e-voting system model by 
using blind signature. Our proposed model meets all security 
requirements which are: (authentication, privacy, integrity, non 
repetition). Our proposed model depends on these main 
entities that are involved within the voting processes (voter 
registration, voting, counting, audit), and these entities are: 
certificate authority, ministry of interior, voter, high committee 
of elections (investigator), and counter. The voter can vote 
from any remote with secured data transfer (ballot) by using 
the blind signature to blinded ballot and then sign it. When it is 
sent to the high committee of elections (investigator) for 
checking the voter eligibility, there is an encrypting random 
value (r) that is attached with the blind ballot, using for 
removing blind the ballot which is encrypted by counter’s 
public key. The high committee of elections checks the 
signature of voter and checks that if he is an eligible voter or 
not. Then removes the voter’s digital signature and puts his 
digital signature and then sends it to the counter party. The 
counter party checks the signature of high committee of 
election and extracts the random value (r) by decrypting with 
his private key and removing the blind ballot and counts the 
vote. 
Keywords : secured e-voting system, blind ballot, 
certificate authority, ministry of interior. 
I. Introduction 
lection is a fundamental instrument of democracy 
that provides an official mechanism for people to 
express their views to the government. 
Traditionally, the process of voting is quite complicated 
because voter must come in person to vote. 
This problem resulting low participation rate at 
elections. Electronic voting system can overcome those 
problems in a national election, by enabling the voter to 
vote from his home or office or from any remote place. 
Although remote electronic voting is more 
flexible and easier for voters than the traditional voting, 
but it also more vulnerable than the traditional voting 
due to the nature of digital processing of election data 
which can be easily spread, manipulated within the 
network, hence that may result in widespread fraud and 
corruption [1, 2]. 
For these reasons, we will propose a prototype 
of the remote electronic voting in this research, which 
may meet the security requirements of voting process 
[3, 4], and can reduce human errors that occurred in the  
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traditional voting process and also reduce the fraud of 
voting with making the process of voting easier and 
more reachable for the voters (citizens)? 
II. Preliminaries 
Let E= {V, VA, T, CA, MOI} be the set of entities 
involved where V voter, VA investigator, T counter, CA 
certificate authority and MOI ministry of interior. Let X Є 
E, X is represented as follows. X= (PK[x], SK[x], nx), 
PK[x] is the public key of Entity X, SK[x] is the private key 
of X, and nx is the RSA constant. Recall that pubx and 
privx are multiplicative inverses to each other mod Ф (nx), 
where Ф (.) is the Euler totient function. We assume privx 
Є {MAX (px,qx), Ф (nx)-1} is a large prime for two large 
primes px, qx, and nx = px * qx. We also assume for 
message M the following holds: 
(M PK[x]) mod nx) SK[x]) mod nx =  
(M) SK[x] mod nx) PK[x]) mod nx = M. 
We also assume for X Є E, X does not knows 
privy of Y Є E, Y ≠ X but knows the rest of Y parameters 
and DCx denotes the digital certificate of X Є E. Thus we 
can represent the entities involved as follows: 
1. V= (PK [Vo], SK [vo], nv). 
2. VA= (PK [VA], SK [vA], nvA). 
3. T= (PK [TA], SK [TA], nTA). 
For two entities X, Y Є E, Y ≠ X, a message m 
from X to Y is sent over a secured channel that follows 
the secured socket protocol as follows: 
X signs on m, generating encrypt privx(H(m)) 
where H is a hashing one way function, X generates a 
session key SK, X generates the encrypted message 
encrypt SK (m ||encrypt privx(H(m))|| DCx), X generates 
the digital envelop encrypt puby(SK) to achieve privacy, 
and finally X sends both the encrypted message and the 
digital envelop to Y. Y opens the envelop as follows: 
SK= decrypt privy (encrypt puby(SK)), Y gets m ||encrypt 
privx(H(m))|| DCx =decryptSK encrypt SK(m ||encrypt 
privx(H(m))|| DCx), Y verifies H(m) = decryptpubx(encrypt 
privx(H(m)) achieving authenticity, non repudiation, and 
message integrity [5]. 
III. The Proposed Protocol 
The procedures and steps that occurred at any 
elections must be divided into three stages: 
1. The pre-voting stage (preparation). 
E 
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2. The voting stage (the casting of the votes). 
3. The post-voting stage (counting, auditing). 
1. The pre-voting stage: this phase includes all 
preparations that occur before the period of 
elections. At proposed model, this stage includes 
these 2 steps: 
a. Voter registration. 
b. Ballot preparations. 
2. The voting stage: this phase includes all the chain of 
steps that occurred within the period of elections 
until the voter casting his vote and send it. At 
proposed model, these stage includes 3 steps: 
a. Voter getting ballot. 
b. Blind ballot. 
c. Validating & signing blind ballot. 
3. The post-voting stage: this phase includes all the 
chain of steps that occurred after the period of 
elections ended, which include all these steps: 
a. Unblind ballot. 
b. Counting the unblind ballots. 
c. Auditing. 
a)
 
Pre-voting Stage
 
i.
 
Voter Registration
 
An individual must register to be an eligible 
voter. This is done before the voting period. Voter 
registration for E-Voting is done as follows:
 
1.
 
The individual generates key pair in smart card. And 
then generates certificate request during the 
generation of certificate request. The system asks 
for his information like name, ID address, and e-
mail, etc.
 
2.
 
The individual sends his certificate request to CA to 
issue digital certificate.
 
3.
 
The CA inquires the information of voter from MOI to 
check if the individual are eligible or not. If eligible, 
the CA issues digital certificate and sends it to 
voter’s email.
 
4.
 
The voter downloads his digital certificate from his 
email and imports to his smart card.
 
5.
 
The voter downloads ballot from the organized 
election website. The ballot contains unique ID to 
prevent multiple casts.
 
ii.
 
Ballot Preparations
 
1.
 
At this stage, the high committee of elections 
(investigator) starts to generate ballots with different 
and unique IDS which include list of candidates' 
names.
 
2.
 
High committee of elections will send the numbers 
of the ballots’ IDS that are generated to the counter 
as a list of the ballots ready for casting votes, 
making this for purpose if the counter received any 
ballot, the ID number will not be included at this list; 
that means that the ballot is invalid. 
3. High committee of elections (investigator) will sign 
each ballot of these ballots using their secret key, so 
the voter must get the ballot (B) signed, which can 
be represented into this equation: 
B SK [VA] mod (nva) 
4. High committee of elections will upload these 
signed ballots into the official website of the 
elections as a preparation step for voters to cast 
their votes. 
b) Voting Phase 
i. Voter Getting the Ballot 
1. Voter will download the ballot from the high 
committee of elections (investigator) website and it 
must be signed also. 
2. Voter will unsign this ballot using the high committee 
of election’s public key, and then will cast his vote 
into the ballot. 
ii. Blind Vote 
1. The voter casts his ballot and then blind ballot as 
Fig (1) by generating a random value (r), such that r 
is relatively prime to N (i.e. gcd(r, N) = 1). The value 
r is raised to the public exponent e modulo N, and 
the resulting value remodN is used as a blinding 
factor [6]. 
2. Voter will encrypt these random no. (r) in two 
different ways: 
a. Voter will encrypt these random no. (r) using the 
investigator's public key, which will be the blind 
factor(BF), so the blind factor can be represented 
into this equation: 
BF = (r PK [va] mod (nva)). 
b. Voter will encrypt this random no. (r) using the 
counter’s public key, which will be used in the 
unblind factor (UBF), so the unblind factor can be 
represented into this equation: 
UBF = (r PK [TA] mod (nTA)). 
3. Voter will blind his ballot using the blind factor by 
multiplying his ballot with the blind factor, so the 
blind ballot (BB) can be represented into this 
equation: 
BB = B* BF 
4. Voter will attach the blind ballot (BB) with the unblind 
factor (UBF), so that will result into B’’ which can be 
represented into this equation B’’ = (BB || UBF), 
SO 
B’’ = (BB || UBF) 
 Voter will sign this B’’ using his secret key, so that 
will be resulted into the signed B’’ (SB’’), which can 
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Proposed Secured Remote E-Voting Model Based on Blind Signature
5.
be represented into this equation                         
SB”= (B”)Sk[vo]mod(nvo). 
iii. Validating & Signed Ballot 
1. The voter sends the SB’’ to the high committee of 
elections (investigator) for authenticating the voter 
and checking the voter’s signature eligibility and 
also to check if the voter voted before or not. 
2. Investigator will verify the voter’s signature as Fig (2) 
by using his public key: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Investigator after verifying the voter signature 
and checking this, the first time for voter to vote 
will sign this B’’ using his secret key; that will 
result into the investigator signing B’’ (VSB’’), 
and can be represented into this equation: 
 
While the investigator using this secret key to 
sign the ballot, this secret key will decrypt the random 
no. that encrypted by the investigator public key (BF) 
which will be resulted. 
 
 
b. Then investigator will send the VSB’’ to the 
counter party. 
c) Post-voting Stage 
i. Unblind Votes 
I. Counter will receive ballots from the investigator 
(VSB’’) then do this process as in Fig (3) into each 
VSB’’: 
a. Counter will insert each VSB’’ into a separator 
function, to get: 
1. The unblind factor but signed from 
investigator (VSUF). 
 
 
2. The Investigator signed ballot (VSBB). 
 
Note the random no. (r) No longer encrypted by 
the investigator public key, because this encryption is 
removed while the investigator signing the blind ballot 
using his secret key. 
b. Counter will verify the signature of investigator 
on the blind factor, which will be resulted into 
the unblind factor: 
  
c. Counter will decrypt the random no. using his 
secret key : 
 
So will get the random no. (r)
 
d.
 
Counter will use the random no. to unblind the 
vote by multiplying the blind ballot through the 
random no. versus:
 
(r * B SK [va]
 
mod(nva) * 1/ r , which will be resulted into the 
ballot unblind and signed from investigator:
 
  
ii.
 
Counting the Unblind Ballots
 
1.
 
Counter after unblinding the vote will count it 
according to the voter selection.
 
2.
 
Counter will declare the result about the candidates 
that take the highest number of ballots counted.
 
iii.
 
Audit
 
1.
 
It’s the phase of auditing and reviewing the counting 
phase. This phase occurred especially in the case 
of when any one of the candidates appealed about 
the counted number of the votes that he have 
gotten, after declaring the result of elections.
 
2.
 
Audit phase occurred under the supervision of high 
committee of elections (investigator) which will 
compare the number of ballots that is generated by 
them and the numbers of the ballots IDS received 
by the counter (check the ID number of each valid 
ballot that is counted by counter).
 
3.
 
High committee of elections also checks the ballots 
that are counted as invalid. Ballots must apply one 
of 3 conditions:
 
a.
 
Ballot no. ID shall not identical to the serial ID 
numbers of ballots that are generated by the 
investigator; that is these ballots are not coming 
from the investigator, but that is considered as 
fraud by any hacker.
 
b.
 
Ballot received by the counter is not signed from 
the high committee of elections (investigator), 
which means that ballot was attached by attacker.
 
c.
 
Ballot received by the counter is not blind 
(unblind) which means also these ballots are 
hacked by hacker.
 
If one of these 3 cases is 
applied, the ballot counted as an unvalid vote.
 
4.
 
The audit phase at our proposed model depends 
on the ballot’s
 
IDS. At this phase, the declaration of 
results is not only about the number of votes that 
each candidate got, but also about the IDS 
numbers of ballots that each candidate has taken; 
that will make the candidate check a random 
sample of his supporters (voters), in order to know 
their ballot’s IDs via checking their ballots counted 
for each candidate.
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SB’’ = ((B)* (rpk[va] mod (nva)),
(rPK[TA] mod (nTA)))
SK[vo]mod(nvo) 
)PK[vo]mod(nvo)., which will resulted 
B’’ = (BB || UBF)
(rPK[TA] mod (nTA)
SK[TA]mod(nTA) = (R)
VSB’’ = (B’’) SK [va] MOD (nva)
VSB’’= ((B) SK [va] MOD (nva) * (r)) ||
(UBF)SK [va] MOD (nva)
VSUF = UBFSK [VA], SO 
VSUF = (rPK[TA])SK[VA]
VSBB = r * (B) SK [VA]
(UBF) = (rPK[TA] mod (nTA))
Vote = B SK [va] mod (nva)
Proposed Secured Remote E-Voting Model Based on Blind Signature
IV. Tables and Figures 
The bellow tables contain the abbreviations 
used in the paper. The table (1) contains the 
abbreviations of key pairs of entities used in the 
proposed model and table (2) contains the 
abbreviations of data items used in the proposed 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 : Blind Phase
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 :
 
Validating Phase
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 :
 
Unblind Phase
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Sk[va] Investigator (high committee of 
elections) secret key
Pk[va] Investigator (high committee of 
elections) public key
Sk[vo] Voter’s secret key
Pk[vo] Voter’s public key
Sk[ta] Counter’s secret key
Pk[ta] Counter’s public key
R. Random no. generated by voter 
application
B Ballot
BF Blind factor, which is (random no.) 
encrypted by investigator public key 
PK[VA]
UBF Unblind factor, which is (random no.) 
encrypted by counter public key 
PK[TA]
BB Blind ballot, which the ballot multiplies
by random no., and this no. encrypted 
by investigator public key PK[VA]
B’’ Blind ballot concatenate the unblind 
factor (BB ||UBF)
SB’’ B’’ signed by voter secret key
VSB’’ B’’ signed by investigator secret key
VSUF unBlind factor that is signed by the 
investigator, using investigator secret 
key SK[VA]
VSBB Blind ballot that signed from the 
investigator, using investigator secret 
key SK[VA]
Vote Ballot  signed from investigator
(unblind)
Table 1 : key pairs of entities in our proposed model
Table 2 : Main data items at our proposed model
Proposed Secured Remote E-Voting Model Based on Blind Signature
V. Conclusion 
We have proposed electronic voting system that 
meets security requirements and we expect the 
participations rate to be increased because the voters 
will not be pending in a long queue. With electronic 
voting, the voting will be faster than the traditional 
voting. 
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